I was
reading an article about the Nigerian Ansaru group (Jama'atu Ansarul Musilimina
fi Biladin Sudan) who reportedly believe that there is an “Islamic empire of
Mali.” While it is true that Islamists are trying to take over the Northern
Mali countryside, they have hardly established an empire there. The Ansaru attacked
Nigerian troops that were on the way to aid Mali’s government. This business of
one group acting in support of another group, in another nation, is an
increasingly common occurrence as the network of Nonstate Armed Groups (NSAGs)
learns to work together. Most of the new groups claim allegiance to the
“al-Qaeda” global narrative that loosely binds them together.
Africa
has become an incubator for extreme Islamist groups. Some spring up
spontaneously and others are splinters of already existing groups. Most follow
on grievances against incumbent governments, like the Taureg of Mali. Some
groups, like Mali’s Taureg, form as autochthonous bodies with local grievances.
Others migrate from one conflict area to another. Others metastasize from
larger, foreign groups, like al-Nusrah’s move from Iraq to Syria. Still others
reform and rename themselves because they were forced out of their original
staging ground like al-Qaeda’s expulsion from Sudan in 1996 and its later
migrations. (We hear they are now back in the Sudan again).
Names of the larger groups have made
headlines in the Western Media. The most ‘popular’ are Algeria’s Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb, (AQIM), Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Somalia’s al-Shebab, and
Mai’s Ansar Dine. Looking at the latest conflict in Syria reveals a
proliferation of extremist Islamist organizations in that country alone, as
positioning for power motivates individuals to form their own groups. We are less
familiar with the names Abdullah
Azzam Brigades, Islamic Kurdish Front, Peshmurga Falcons, Fatah al-Islam, Ahrar
al-Sham Battalions, al-Tawhid Brigade, but they and some 30 other groups are
also NSAGs active in Syria today. And that’s only Syria. The global numbers are
quite staggering.
The prevalent means of dealing with
these groups is military intervention. There is little or no talking being done
with NSAGs. Most Western nations hold fast to the idea that “there is no
negotiating with terrorists, ” and most put all NSAGs in the terrorist
grouping; sometimes with cause, and sometimes only with caution. That’s a big
problem because it rules out conversation.
NSAGs are here and they play an
increasing role in world events. Conflicts between NSAGs and state governments
vastly outnumber wars between states and conflicts between NSAGs themselves
occur just as often. In 1989 NSAGs created 20 percent of the violence. In 1998
that had risen to 80%. A rational U.S. foreign policy would not ignore these
facts, these groups, and the violence that ensues, and yet, for the most part
it is not addressed directly.
Barak Obama was applauded for his
political bravery when, in his 2009 his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, he said
“I know that engagement with repressive regimes lacks the
satisfying purity of indignation. But I also know that sanctions without
outreach—condemnation without discussion—can carry forward only a crippling
status quo. No repressive regime can move down a new path unless it has the
choice of an open door.”
No
such recognition of the importance of discussion with NSAGs has been
forthcoming from his administration. One of the first hurdles is to admit that
the ‘terrorist’
labels impede communications, and that not all NSAGs are terrorist
organizations.
We
have talked with NSAGs before. The success of our partnership with Iraq’s wakening
Councils in Anbar considerably retarded al-Qaeda’s growth. On the other hand, the
Taliban talks of Ambassador Clinton have so far yielded nothing helpful.
The
vast majority of majority of Islamist takeovers and threats, whether electoral
or not, began with protests against corruption, marginalization, etc., not
mass-religious movements. Islam, radical Islamism, and all shades between, was
the answer, not the cause. Examples abound: Iran in 1979, Algeria in 1991,
Afghanistan in 1997, Somalia in 2004, Palestine in 2006, Egypt in the 2000s, the
Arab Spring movements, and Mali’s Tauregs. Such objections to governments might
very well be amenable to dialogue.
Then I
came across Payton L. Knopf’s October 2011 paper: Enhancing U.S. Diplomatic
Engagement with Nonstate Armed Groups [full paper]. He delineates a process for the
State Department to analyze volatile situations that may benefit from
conversations with NSAGs. It calls for developing a critical profile of the
group, defining the objectives of the conversation, and doing a careful
cost/benefit analysis; all in the pursuit of a sensible decision about whether
or not to engage in dialogue. The project manager in me is attracted by his
plan, most especially the way in which it calls for heavy analysis up front,
before the decision to engage or not is finalized. It recognizes that each
situation is unique and seeks to enumerate possible problems for each encounter.
The Process (Quite abbreviated):
Develop a detailed profile looking at the group's
- Leadership
- Military
effectiveness
- Constituency
- Degree
of territorial control
- Platform
- Sponsors
- Needs
Define the U.S.'s objectives of the engagement with respect to:
- preventing
the emergence of a conflict before it affects the interests of the United
States or its allies;
- improving
humanitarian access;
- gathering
intelligence/information;
- changing
the governing structure of a state, either through regime change because the
state is an adversary or
through reform because of the legitimate political aspirations of a segment of
the population;
- marginalizing
or weaken the group, for example, by using engagement to foment splinters;
- encouraging
moderation or transform the group into a nonviolent political party;
- facilitating
a peace agreement; and
- preventing
a group from spoiling a political process or negotiations.
Do a careful cost benefit analysis
Possible benefits:
- preventing
the outbreak of a conflict that would damage U.S. interests;
- facilitating
a political process to address the legitimate grievances of an NSAG, such as
marginalizationby
the central government;
- bolstering
the U.S. image among important constituencies;
- facilitating
peace negotiations toward an agreement to end a conflict;
- gaining
information on the NSAG to better inform U.S. policy decisions;
- reducing
tensions with an NSAG sponsor toward which the United States seeks an improved
bilateral relationship;
- mitigating
violence perpetrated by an NSAG by providing a channel for the expression of
grievances through
political rather than violent means, undermining its claim that violence is the
only path
given its diplomatic isolation, or brokering a ceasefire; and
- exploiting
fissures within a movement by empowering more pragmatic elements through
diplomatic contact,
either to neutralize the movement or to shift its platform in line with U.S.
foreignpolicy
goals.
Possible Costs
- conferring
legitimacy on a group whose aims or tactics the United States views as anathema
to its interests;
- undermining
the legitimacy of the state(s) in which the group operates or eroding the
state’s ability to
govern;
- empowering
a particular ethnic, religious, or sectarian group represented by the NSAG over another
group with whom it is competing;
- creating
a precedent for violence as a means of gaining international recognition;
- providing
an opportunity for an NSAG to enhance its military capacity while engaging in a
diversionary dialogue
with the United States; and
- triggering
U.S. domestic opposition to engagement that undermines support for the policy.
“Given the difficulty of developing a
functional data set, there is no conclusive study comparing the successes or
failures of U.S. engagement with NSAGs. However, policymakers contemplating an increased
role for the State Department in conflict mitigation and prevention should
consider that, since the 1980s, the number of conflicts that ended with a peace
agreement is four times higher than the number of conflicts that ended through
military victory. The data suggests nonpolitical means of conflict resolution
are far less effective than political dialogue. Given the preponderance of NSAGs
in today’s conflicts, contact may, in fact, be more effective than isolation or
military action.” (Knopf)
It is worth noting that:
- engagement does
not equal negotiation. U.S. involvement is a delicate issue;
- negotiations
alone rarely end a terrorist campaign;
- early talk can
prevent a lot;
- later talk can
mitigate violence and associated human rights infringements (rape, torture,
etc.); and
- timing is everything;
There’s no sense stepping into a conflict while the opposition still has high
hopes of victory through violence.
Knopf
concludes with a recommendation that the U.S. should begin to build its
diplomatic capabilities by creating a new career track for nontraditional diplomacy.
We cannot agree more.
January
23, 2013 by Bruce Wallace, 121Contact
