The rise of physiological and psychological explanations for terrorist behavior in the 1940’s and 1950’s involved Freudian theories. This and post-Freudian group psychology led helped explain violent behavior in terms of personality disorders. Then psychotherapy gave way to behaviorism. By the 1970’s cognitive interpretations of behavior rose in prominence. Studies and experiments began to paint a more scientific picture.
An individual’s acceptance of indiscriminate violence for social aims was related to the ‘slippery slope’ of psychological mechanisms that could lead one to the point of embracing terrorism as legitimate.
But U.S. policy makers, among others, clung to earlier and more politically useful views. Science funded by the government leaned on earlier theories which ignored political and logical motivations. This was convenient for those wishing to avoid any indication that foreign policy had anything at all to do with reasons terrorists attacked America. Born of this need for a narrow viewpoint, the Radicalization Theory of Terrorism was developed.
After the events of 9/11 governments were eager to embrace non-political theories to absolve themselves of any guilt associated with terrorist motives. A need for a discourse to serve these ends was filled with new views, research, and publicity about Radicalization. Without proof, but with an ‘authoritative’ voice, ‘Radicalization’ as it became known, attributed terrorism to a path that flowed from increased religiosity. The New York City report, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat” was loaded with unsupported statements like, “Self Identification is the phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam.” It may seem ludicrous now, but in the rush to ‘do something’ the report’s simplistic answers were quickly adopted and made manifest in policy.
There was seen no need to consider the fact that most people who become extremely religious are not violent. All that was needed was to track Muslims, note those who became more and more religious, and that would produce suspects for investigation. Of course this led to intrusive spying and a backlash from the Muslim community.
New York City’s program became a national model that other cities now follow. This infection of misunderstanding has spread, and like any other program, is self-perpetuating in ideology and funding. As a result the overall response of the U.S. is flawed and weaker than it could be because of false assumptions, special interests of policy makers, and a need to appear strong and unwavering to their constituents.
It’s not too late to change. Incorporation of more science into policy is possible. But policy makers will have overcome inertia, and that is never easy.
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