May 24, 2013 by Bruce Wallace, 121Contact
"Intelligence (noun). The ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations." [1]
America is losing the “War on Terror.” In
the aftermath of 9/11 we suffered from panicked, instinctive reactions that have
driven errors in preparation, immediate response, long and short term planning,
This led to policy decisions that make us more, not less, vulnerable to
terrorist attacks. The distorted thinking and over-reactive responses also
negatively impacted our justice system and collective sense of values.
The errors. Perhaps
the most important strategic error was our declaring a “War on Terror,” with
its implication of the possibility of a final victory. The war rhetoric guides
our responses to violent actions that have unexpected results exactly because
we are dealing with terrorist mindsets and not with classical, international
conflicts.
The
Drone war generates more terrorists than it kills because of the recruiting
power of the perceived atrocities that the U.S. commits with its targeted
killings and consequent deaths of innocent civilians. The insertion of American
troops into Arab lands has become a powerful part of al Qaeda’s global narrative
of terrorism. They refer these ‘occupations’ often in Inspire Magazine
and other media, to justify martyrdom operations.[2]
The creation of Guantanamo Prison, the use of extraordinary rendition, torture
and the creation of numerous ‘black sites’ are also used as recruitment
inducements.
The
Presidency has taken extraordinary powers unto itself making the Office of
President judge, jury, and final word on assassinations of both citizens and
non-citizens alike. There has been a strong backlash among local populations
that serves to engender widespread and strong resentment against the U.S. This
serves to radicalize people already suspicious of American motives. The
radicalized are those most prone to take the next step: becoming radicalized to
violence. (Moghaddam) Our policies are aiding the
difficult emotional step of accepting, as honorable, the indiscriminate killing
in the name of a ‘higher’ cause, i.e., becoming a terrorist.
At
home we have taken drastic, and sometimes ludicrous, measures to ‘ensure
safety.’ The Patriot Act has taken constitutional rights away from Americans. The
Homeland Security airport procedures and random searches in subway stations have
become expensive exercises that serve mainly to terrorize people who are going
about their daily business. Media, Government, and Law Enforcement ‘experts’ have
consistently framed the dangers as imminent when they are of relatively low
risk. Little of their pronouncements are backed by science. Our overall
response to 9/11 was and continues to be one of exaggeration and
narrow-mindedness.
Why have we made Errors in Judgment? The sciences that study thought
processes, especially those manifest under stress, are revealing distortions in
logic that act beneath our usual awareness. These distortions cause errors in
thinking and lead to inevitable errors in judgment. This logical chain is
demonstrable in the laboratory and is predictable, mainly within the science of
cognitive and social-cognitive studies. Psychological influences on our
individual and group responses to fear and outside threats are measurable and
help to explain our individual, national, and government reactions to 9/11.
Cognitive
science teaches us that negativity bias causes us to pay attention to and give
more weight to our fears of attack than is warranted by facts. It’s only
natural, as is the effect of loss aversion. This fear of losing our lives moves
the government and the population at large to accept huge costs to avoid what
might be small chances of attacks. Threats generate changes in thought that are
more conservative and more accepting of immediate violent solutions. (Cohen)
International war becomes an acceptable, even welcome, response. Under stress we
tend to replace logical thinking with black and white
views, rigidity, and closed-mind perception. (Hudson)
These
mechanisms facilitate the manipulation of popular perceptions. What the
‘experts’ say tends to be taken, by most people, at face value with little
critical thought.
Primary
Misunderstandings.
Basic flaws in understanding the nature of terrorist organizations and their
mindset lead to false conclusions about the best way to thwart their efforts. This
interferes with our critical ability to “Pay attention to the impact of US
action/policy on Terrorism’s thinking, beliefs, and goals.”[3]
One example was the persistence of “Black Sites”, at one time involving over 50
countries, which yielded little actionable data but functioned as a constant
source of propaganda for terrorists. In each of those countries the local
Islamists have ‘proof’ that the local government is a partner to the America’s
anti-Muslim crusade.
Targeted killing
has likewise been more advantageous to al Qaeda than to the “War on Terror.” The
‘top level terrorist operatives’ that are assassinated are quickly replaced and
the effect on the terrorist groups is generally minimal and short-lived. The
longer-term effects of our quick-response violence against terrorists is an
area worthy of more study.
Bakker
and Veldhuis delineate a number of misperceptions that skew decision making
about strategy, tactics, and policy:
- Western
fear is not commensurate with the numbers of actual incidents.
- Fear
leads to overreaction which can lead to extreme policy decisions which can
generate the backlash of increased recruitment power to terrorists.
- Threat
assessments become possibility-based, rather than statistically arrived at,
vastly inflating the danger.
- Primarily
due to the fact that “perceived collective fear of terrorism can contribute to
elevating real fear of terrorism, irrespective of whether the perception of
shared fear is accurate or not,” we find
ourselves in panic mode when a thoughtful, measured response would be more
appropriate. (Bakker, Veldhuis)
Simple
finance also plays a role in exaggerating threats. The media know that
sensationalism sells. They cash in whenever they get the opportunity to
heighten our fears with graphic depictions of the latest terrorist attack. We
also should not ignore the effect of corporate influence on Congressional approval
of vast sums allocated to questionably effective anti-terrorist initiatives,
equipment, and munitions.
Managing Perceptions as Part of Counterterrorism. The government, academia, science,
and the media all have important roles in correcting the perceptions of
terrorism and its impact, both real (historically) and potential for two main
reasons. Distorted reasoning leads to:
1) The adoption of ineffective
counterterrorism measures, and
2)
An enormous waste of money.
If
we exaggerate threats and perceive them as imminent when they are not, then we
risk suffering the stress-amplified impairment of confirmation bias (assuming
our worst fears are reality) which can lead us into restrictive modes of
thought just when we need maximum flexibility and openness. Terrorists have
proven to be highly adaptable, changing effectively as we try to limit their
actions. We, on the other hand, have proven to be rigid in our thought and slow
to adapt to rapidly changing tactics.
Those
in leadership positions must learn to recognize when psychological pressures
compromise intelligent thought. The general populace must also learn to
realistically assess the world around them before they make decisions as to
personal safety and who to vote for.
Science
has shown us these mechanisms that interfere with rational decision making. We
now have to disseminate that knowledge so that we can all be better at resisting
the terrorist’s aim of inducing panic and irrational thought.
In
the aftermath of a terrorist action it is important to manage fear. This
requires preparation beforehand as well as coordinated activity as part of the
response. Our natural tendency assume the worst (negativity bias), fundamental
attribution error (painting terrorists as madmen), and media’s propensity for
sensationalism all have to be mitigated to ensure intelligent decision making
on the part of government, and intelligent response on the part of the public.
Distortions that occur right after an attack tend to persist and further cloud
perceptions and, therefore, policy making. Scientific risk assessment, clear
information about preparedness, realistic assessment of the perpetrators, and
robust communications networks can help ease the emotional effects of
terrorism. (Breckenridge and Zimbardo)
Obstacles to Progress. There
are many obstacles to thinking effectively about terrorism. Three are
particularly harmful. The first because it irrationally affects who we elect as
decision makers; the second and third because they have a pervasive effect on
the population as a whole.
1)
The power of self-interest: There is a tension between seeking the greater good
and striving for our own well-being. Official seeking office may pander to fear
by increasing the public’s anxiety,
2)
Media may frame events in the most inflammatory way to increase circulation,
and
3)
The apathy of the populace may work to maintain the status quo. People have the
power to alter the direction of political, educational, and communications
discourse, but only if they are willing to work toward those ends.
The
great power amassed at the head of political, media, and corporate entities
presents a formidable wall that leads to frustration on the part of those
seeking change, which leads to apathy in the face of hopelessness. These
elements define a self-feeding, societally self-destructive set of mechanisms. But
there is a way out.
Keys to success.
The critical path to a future in which we can apply more intelligent handling
of the terrorist threat lies within educational sphere. Institutions of
learning have access to the thought processes of young people. While they are
learning to apply intelligence to solving problems we can enlighten them as to
the real-world factors that can influence the clarity of their thinking. Awareness
of cognitive mechanisms that can interfere with logical thought should be part
of the teaching curriculum at all levels, from pre-school through advanced
studies. In this way we will arm our citizens with the tools required for an
intelligent approach to the existence of terrorism in our world.
We
also have to work to mitigate the current impairments to judgment by exposing
the general public to the distortions that are guiding today’s policy
decisions. This calls for more government transparency and requires cooperation
of the media. Both are extremely difficult goals. Although there is some
movement in this direction, more would be helpful.
President Obama’s May
24, 2013 speech contained acknowledgement of some of these problems and mostly
vague promises to take steps in the right direction. Even if he can convince
Congress to implement his proposals it will not be enough.
America can move to more efficacious
actions, but only if we seek an unbiased truth. We must admit our errors, do
the necessary research, and implement strategies and tactics based upon sound
science.
Bibliography
"About
Those Black Sites." Editorial. New York Times. New York Times, 18
Feb. 2013.
Bakker,
E. and Veldhuis, T. "A Fear Management Approach to Counterterrorism."
Discussion Paper, International Centre
for Counterterrorism, The Hague (February
2012).
Beck,
A.T. (2002). Prisoners of hate. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 40, 209-216
Breckenridge,
H.N., & Zimbardo, P.G (2007). The strategy of terrorism and the
psychology of mass-mediated fear In B.
Bongar, et.al., (eds.) Psychology of
Terrorism (pp. 116-133). New York:
Oxford University Press
Cohen,
S. (2011). Psychological theories of terrorism and political violence; a non-
linear evolution. To appear in: Encyclopedia of the History of
psychological
theories. New York,
Springer
Friedman,
Benjamin H. Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security, Political
Science Quarterly, Volume 126,
Number 1, Spring 2011, pp.77-106.
Hudson,
R.A. (1999). The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a
terrorist and why? Washington, D.C. Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress.
Moghaddam,
F. M. (2007). The staircase to terrorism: IN: Bongar, B., Brown, LM,
Beurler,
Le, Breckenridge, JN, and Zimbardo, PG (eds.) Psychology of Terrorism,
pp.69-80. Oxford: Oxford University
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[1] http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intelligence
[2] http://info.publicintelligence.net/OSC-AlQaedaMasterNarratives.pdf
[3] A.T. Beck (2002),
Prisoners of hate. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 209-216
